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George Meade’s Mixed Legacy
Abstract
George Gordon Meade was 47 years old the morning of June 28, 1863, when command of the Army of the
Potomac was unceremoniously dumped into his lap by General in Chief Henry Hallcck, and there is no reason
to doubt Meade's protest that the move rendered him the most surprised man in the entire Union Army.
Meade had never wanted to be a soldier in the first place, much less take direction of an army that at that
moment was facing perhaps its most daunting challenge. But compared to his immediate predecessors, Maj.
Gens. Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, what Meade accomplished with that army was simply
extraordinary -- he won the Battle of Gettysburg. Even more extraordinary, he defeated the supposedly
invincible Robert E. Lee and the vaunted Army of Northern Virginia, And yet the mention of Meade has
always been met with a certain degree of pause -- surprise that an officer with such modest credentials could
manage to pull off such a mammoth victory as Gettysburg, and then chirping criticism that, having triumphed
as he did, Meade failed to do more, failed to stop Lee from escaping back into Virginia and thus end the Civil
War right there and then. ¸ Although both of those reactions are unfair, they are also accurate. And together,
they have come to define George Gordon Meade's long-term reputation. [excerpt]
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George Meade's 
ever-present 
pince-nez 
spectacles hang 
from a lanyard 
about his neck. 
George Meade's 
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THE GENERAL WON AT GETTYSBURG. 
I N SPITE OF HIMSELF 
By Allen C. Guelzo 
George Gordon Meade was 4 7 years old the morning of 
June 28, 1863, when command of the Army of the Potomac was uncer-
emoniously dumped into his lap by General in Chief Henry Halleck, and 
there is no reason to doubt Meade's protest that the move rendered him the 
most surprised man in the entire Union Army. Meade had never wanted 
to be a soldier in the first place, much less take direction of an army that at 
that moment was facing perhaps its most daunting challenge. But com-
pared to his immediate predecessors, Maj. Gens. Ambrose Burnside and 
Joseph Hooker, what Meade accomplished with that army was simply 
extraordinary- he won the Battle of Gettysburg. Even more extraordinary, 
he defeated the supposedly invincible Robert E. Lee and the vaunted Army 
of Northern Virginia. ~ And yet the mention of Meade has always been 
met with a certain degree of pause--surprise that an officer with such 
modest credentials could manage to pull off such a mammoth victory as 
Gettysburg, and then chirping criticism that, having triumphed as he did, 
Meade failed to do more, failed to stop Lee from escaping back into 
Virginia and thus end the Civil War right there and then. ~ Although both 
of those reactions are unfair, they are also accurate. And together, they 
have come to define George Gordon Meade's long-term reputation. 
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Meade stands in the center of his staff at his headquarters near Culpeper, Va., in September 1863. Major General Andrew A. 
Humphreys, at Meade's left, led a Ill Corps division at Gettysburg but became Meade's chief of staff following the battle. 
Meade's father was a second-generation Phila-
delphia merchant with substantial investments in Spain 
during the Napoleonic Wars, investments that turned 
horribly sour and resulted in the elder Meade's prema-
ture death in 1828. The U.S. Military Academy was the 
one place where the young Meade could obtain a free 
college education, so off he went to West Point, never 
intending ''to remain in the army after his graduation, 
but merely to serve in it sufficiently long to warrant his 
resigning, as having afforded an equivalent for his educa-
tion." He graduated 19th in the 56-cadet Class of 1835, 
put in a year as a second lieutenant in the 3rd Artillery 
and then resigned his commission to become a civil engi-
neer. Four years later he finally made up the social dis-
tance lost due to the bankruptcy and death of his father 
by marrying into Philadelphia's Whig ascendancy. His 
bride, Margaretta Sergeant, was the daughter of Henry 
Clay's running mate in Clay's failed Whig Party presi-
dential bid against Andrew Jackson in 1832. 
But Meade does not seem to have prospered in civil 
employment, and in 1842 he took the unusual step of re-
entering the Army, as a second lieutenant in the Corps of 
Engineers. He served as a staff officer during the 
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Mexican War, and by the time he made captain in 1856, his 
principal contributions were a series of lighthouses on the 
Jersey and Florida shores and a survey of the Great 
Lakes. He was still on duty in Detroit when, on August 31, 
1861, he was summoned to report to Maj. Gen. George B. 
McClellan and take up a command in the Pennsylvania 
Reserve Division as a brigadier general of volunteers. 
The figure of George McClellan looms large for Meade, 
a fact Meade's biographers were not always eager to ad-
mit. Both were Philadelphians, from socially prominent 
Philadelphia families. Both families were also conserva-
tive Whigs until the mid-1850s, when the controversy 
over slavery drove conservative Whigs into the arms of 
the Stephen Douglas Democrats. Meade's brigadier gen-
eral's commission "was due to him [McClellan], and 
almost entirely to him," and Meade reciprocated McClel-
lan's endorsement. "I have great confidence personally in 
McClellan," Meade wrote shortly before coming east in 
1861, and "know him well-know he is one of the best 
men we have to handle large armies." 
Meade also had great confidence in McClellan's politics, 
since McClellan stood for the idea of limiting the war 
strictly to the goal of national reunion, leaving the slavery 
question out of the picture entirely. He frankly hoped that 
"the ultras on both sides" would somehow ''be repudiated, 
& the masses of conservative & moderate men may com-
promise & settle the difficulty." If anything, Meade had an 
even greater stake in compromise than McClellan: Vir-
ginia Governor Henry Wise was one of Meade's brothers-
in-law on his wife's side, and two of his sisters had married 
Southerners. His sister Charlotte, in fact, saw her Mis-
sissippi plantation pillaged by Union soldiers, and lost two 
of her sons fighting for the Confederacy. If Meade desired 
victory, it was a limited one that would either convince the 
South that "it is useless to contend any longer," or one that 
induced "the people of the North ... to yield the independ-
ency of the South on the ground that it does not pay to 
resist them." It was not clear whether George Meade had 
a preference either way. 
Meade performed well as a brigade commander on the 
Virginia Peninsula, and then as a division commander in 
the I Corps at Antietam. AI> he rose in rank, he also rose 
in notice, though not quite in the ways he might have 
wanted. Although everyone granted, as Charles Francis 
Adams did, that Meade was "a man of high character," he 
frequently spoiled it by being "irritable, petulant and 
dyspeptic." Theodore Lyman put it as diplomatically as 
he could when he said that Meade "is a man full of sense 
of responsibility"-in other words, he feared being in 
over his head-and anxiety gave Meade "the most singu-
lar patches of gunpowder in his disposition." Alexander 
Webb, who carved out his own reputation at Gettysburg, 
described Meade as "a very irascible man" who "allowed 
his tongue to run away with him." AI>sistant Secretary of 
War Charles Dana found Meade "agreeable to talk to 
when his mind was free," but also easily subject to "fits of 
nervous irritation" that could turn him into the general-
from-hell, "totally lacking in cordiality toward those with 
whom he had business." 
Among the ordinary soldiers, Meade "might have been 
taken for a Presbyterian clergyman, unless one ap-
proached him when he was mad," and then the unhappy 
messenger was liable to be the target of a livid stream of 
fury, impatience and arrogance. Behind his back, Meade 
was called "a damned old goggle-eyed snapping turtle," 
and an officer in the 118th Pennsylvania, who called him 
"Old Four Eye" (from the pince-nez Meade wore on a rib-
bon attached to his uniform coat), thought that Meade 
"appears to be a man universally despised." 
This did not prevent Meade from finally winning corps 
command after leading the only near-successful Union 
attack at Fredericksburg in December 1862, and he con-
tinued to serve as commander of the V Corps throughout 
the dismal shambles of "Fighting Joe" Hooker's Chan-
cellorsville Campaign in May 1863. But the decision to 
appoint Meade as Hooker's successor in command of the 
Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863, was anything but 
a foregone conclusion. Radical Republicans in Congress 
' Charles Francis Adams 
wrote that while Meade was 
a 'man of high character,' he 
spoiled it by being 'irritable, 
petulant and dyspeptic' 
were convinced that Meade was just another politically 
unreliable McClellan Democrat, an impression Meade had 
unwisely made in the spring of 1861 when he refused 
Michigan Senator Zachariah Chandler's invitation to par-
ticipate in a mass Union meeting in Detroit. In retaliation, 
Chandler tried to block Meade's initial appointment as a 
brigadier general, under the assumption that Meade must 
have been born a Southerner, and "they would not trust 
the chicken hatched from an egg laid in that region." After 
Chancellorsville, Lincoln bestowed command of the Army 
of the Potomac on George Meade-bestowed being the op-
erative word, since (unlike Burnside or Hooker) Lincoln 
did not consult, request or beg Meade to take charge, but 
simply ordered him to take command. 
The order came to Meade in the wee hours of 
the morning of June 28, 1863, a Sunday. The staff officer 
from Washington bearing the orders further startled 
Meade by woefully announcing, "General, I am the bear-
er of sad news." This induced Meade to think for a mo-
ment that he was being put under arrest, since he and 
Hooker had been at violent loggerheads over the blame 
for Chancellorsville to the point where it was feared "a 
court martial might ensue." The orders, when Meade tore 
them open, told an entirely different tale, and his first 
impulse was to rouse his staff with the injunction, "Get 
up! I'm in command of the Army of the Potomac." The 
news, however, did not set off spontaneous demonstra-
tions of joy in the army. In the III Corps, which was com-
manded by pro-Lincoln Democrat Dan Sickles, and which 
featured as its senior division commander the abolitionist 
David Bell Birney, Meade was "not liked ... and is espe-
cially disliked by General Birney," who understood the 
goal of the war as "first to abolish slavery- and second to 
restore the Union." 
Hooker, in fact, had been in mid-stride at the moment 
he was relieved of command, hoping to lunge westward 
from Frederick, Md., and strike the Army of Northern 
Virginia with the I, III and XI Corps under Maj. Gen. 
John Reynolds, as the Rebel army was strung out along 
the roads between the Potomac crossings at its rear and 
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John Reynolds feared 
that Meade would permit 
Robert E. Lee to go on 
'ad infmitum plundering the 
State of Pennsylvania' ./ 
Harrisburg at its front. Swapping horses at full gallop like 
this would have given even the most aggressive general 
plenty of reason to pause and calculate, and it was charac-
teristic of Meade, who had seen in his own family how 
precarious success could be, to play matters as safely as 
possible. Reynolds' attack wing was recalled and redirect-
ed northward, while at the same time Meade selected a 
back-up defensive position at the Maryland-Pennsylvania 
border, along "the general line of Pipe-clay Creek." 
Meade's plans for Pipe Creek were promptly inter-
preted by Sickles to mean that "the army was 
to fall back, and not to follow up the 
enemy any further; the general 
regarding the objects of the 
campaign to be accom-
plished, and consid-
ering Washington, 
Meade's dress uniform, 
including the elaborate 
sword Brig. Gen. Samuel 
Crawford's Pennsylvania 
division presented to him 
on August 28, 1863. 
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Baltimore and Pennsylvania to be relieved." They were 
also met with a certain amount of quiet resistance from 
Reynolds, who actually outranked Meade in seniority on 
the U.S. Volunteers' commissioning list, a subject that was 
going to provide yet another point of difficulty for Meade. 
Reynolds was dismayed at Meade's "dilatory measures" 
and feared that Meade would permit Lee "either to have 
taken Harrisburg or gone on ad infinitum plundering the 
State of Pennsylvania." And in large measure the decision 
to fight at Gettysburg was made by Reynolds, on his own 
hook, rather than by Meade, who was still trying to sort 
out the deployment of his own army and of Lee's. 
On July 1, when the Battle of Gettysburg opened west 
of Gettysburg, Reynolds simply sent back to Meade an 
aide, informing the new commander that "while I am aware 
that it is not your desire to force an engagement at that 
point, still I feel at liberty to advance and develop the 
strength of the enemy." 
From that moment, a long train of grievances and 
quarrels with Meade began to emerge from within the 
Army of the Potomac. Meade ruffled the feathers of Maj. 
Gen. Oliver 0. Howard by sending Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott 
Hancock ahead to take charge of the Gettysburg 
situation on July 1, despite Howard's senior-
ity to Hancock on the commissioning list, and it was only 
after Hancock's report came back, "partially approving 
this line," that Meade finally set off for Gettysburg, arriv-
ing at 1 a.m. July 2. Meade ruffled still more feathers by 
relieving Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday of I Corps command, 
which Doubleday had inherited after Reynolds was killed 
by a sharpshooter on July 1, and replacing Doubleday 
with an even more junior officer, the colorless Maj. Gen. 
John Newton. Nor did it help matters that Howard and 
Doubleday were among the most senior Republican offi-
cers in the Army of the Potomac, and that Hancock and 
Newton were unapologetic McClellan Democrats. 
But Meade was promptly paid in similar coin by Maj. 
Gen. Henry Slocum, commander of the XII Corps and 
both Meade's senior (again, by commission) and a Re-
publican. Despite Meade's instinct for caution, the new 
army commander hoped to throw some kind of offensive 
punch from Gulp's Hill on the morning of July 2 with the 
XII Corps and Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick's VI Corps. But 
Sedgwick was slow to reach Gettysburg that day, and 
Slocum dismissed Meade's plans as impractical, preferring 
to fortify as best his men could the twin peaks of Gulp's 
Hill. Like the new manager of some particularly unhappy 
office full of suspicious old-timers, Meade had to cope with 
the fact that command was not the same thing as control. 
In the meanwhile, Meade completely missed the dark-
ening cloud of Confederate troops massing on his left 
flank, and left the III Corps and the much-despised Sick-
les dangling at the marshy end of the ridgeline that ran 
south from Cemetery Hill. Sickles, who returned Meade's 
distaste, took his own counsel and posted the III Corps 
instead at the Emmitsburg Road-just in time for it to be 
overrun by James Longstreet's fierce flank attack, and 
the battle brought within an ace of being lost. 
It is difficult now to assess whether it was Sickles' 
chicken-brained insubordination or Meade's neglect of 
his left flank that was more responsible for the sorry 
results of July 2. But wherever the blame lies, it is rea-
sonably certain that by the evening of the 2nd, Meade's 
mind was turning to the safety of Pipe Creek. Eight 
months after the battle, the Army of the Potomac's chief 
of staff, Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, testified before 
Congress that Meade had instructed him on the morning 
of July 2 "to prepare an order to withdraw the army ... 
from the field of Gettysburg." 
Butterfield swore that the onset of Longstreet's attack 
prevented any distribution of the order, but whether 
Butterfield was in fact inventing the story for the purpose 
of evening up grudges with Meade, the army commander 
does seem to have been ready to issue such an order by 9 
o'clock that night, when he called a council of his corps 
commanders. Even the usually loyal Sedgwick told his VI 
Corps staffer Martin McMahon that he had been sum-
moned to the council because "General Meade was think-
ing of a retreat." 
Keeper of 
the Coasts 
Barnegat Bay light entered service in 1859. Decommissioned 
in 1927, 'Old Barney" was relit on January 1, 2009, 150 years 
after it first served as a beacon on the New Jersey coastline. 
Lieutenant George Meade began building lighthouses in 1843, a job that might have suited the talents of the young engineer 
even better than soldiering. In fac~ as Tom 
Huntington, author of Searching for George Gor-
don Meade: The Forgotten Victor of Gettysburg, 
puts i~ "If not for the Civil War, Meade might be 
little more than a footnote in the history of Ameri-
can lighthouses." Assigned to the Army Corps of 
Topographical Engineers, he learned marine engi-
neering from Major Hartman Bache, among other 
mentors, and worked on America's first screwpile 
lighthouse, at Brandywine Shoal on Delaware Bay. 
--~ -·- 2! ~ I ·-
~ --~ ::~ I .. ··~·:~ 
I '· 
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Meade oversaw construction 
of many more screwpile and 
masonry lighthouses before 
returning to active military 
duty during the Civil War. 
He also designed a new type 
of lamp that was adopted 
throughout the U.S. In 1957 
a bronze bust of Meade was 
installed at the base of the 
163-foot-tall Barnegat Bay 
light as part of a centennial 
commemoration. 
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' 
James Longstreet fully 
expected 'to see Meade ride 
to the front and lead his forces 
to a tremendous counter-charge 
at Little Round Top' 
If so, Meade was rudely jolted by the unanimous protest 
of his subordinates that the Army stay put and fight. "We 
have been hunting Lee for weeks," Sedgwick protested, 
"and now that we've got him here, don't retreat." Hancock 
agreed: "The Army of the Potomac has had too many 
retreats .... Let this be our last retreat." Meade was 
"greatly displeased with the result," and only gave way 
grudgingly: "Have it your way, gentlemen, but Gettys-
burg is no place to fight a battle in." No one doubted 
Meade's personal courage, but they could not help notic-
ing his risk-averse inclinations: "He thought it better to 
retreat with what we had, than run the risk of losing all." 
'IWenty years after the battle, John Gibbon (who was in 
temporary command of the II Corps) remembered Meade 
warning him at the end of the council, "Gibbon, if Lee 
attacks me to-morrow it will be on your front." This rec-
ollection, from the most ardently anti-abolitionist officer 
of his rank in the Army, has conferred on Meade the gift 
of prescience, especially since the great Confederate 
attack of July 3 fell exactly upon the two intact brigades 
of Gibbon's old division at what is known to history as 
"the Angle." It is curious, though, that if Meade really did 
prophesy to Gibbon, he did so little to reinforce Gibbon's 
sector around the so-called "clump of trees" and the 
Bryan House. Of course, by the morning of July 3, Meade 
had comparatively little left on hand for reinforcing any-
thing. In a note he dashed off to Margaretta at 8:45 a.m., 
Meade wrote, "We had a great fight yesterday ... both 
armies shattered-Today at it again with what result 
remains to be seen." Shattered indeed: The I, III, V and 
XI Corps had been wrecked in the previous two days' 
fighting, as had two divisions of the II Corps and the XII 
Corps. Beyond Gibbon's old II Corps division, Meade was 
left with only the VI Corps as a reserve. 
Even so, Meade gave no sign of anticipating the fall of 
the Rebel hammer. When speaking to Brig. Gen. John C. 
Robinson, whose battered I Corps division was holding 
grimly onto the slopes of Cemetery Hill, Meade informed 
Robinson that he "anticipated an attack on the cemetery 
by the enemy's forces massed in the town" rather than 
from Seminary Ridge. And when, near 1 p.m., the great 
preliminary barrage for Pickett's Charge began raining 
down on Gibbon and on Meade's headquarters just to Gib-
bon's rear, Meade's first move was to clear his staff from 
the line of Confederate fire and move his headquarters 
back to Powers Hill-the outpost where two batteries of 
10-pounder Parrott guns (Joseph Knap's Battery E, Penn-
sylvania Independent Artillery, and Charles Winegar's 
Battery M, 1st New York Light Artillery) had been post-
ed to cover the Baltimore Pike, and the obvious line of 
retreat from Gettysburg. 
Meade was, in fact, nowhere near the apex of Pickett's 
Charge when the high tide of the Confederacy struck the 
Angle, and he did not show up until his staffers were able 
to report the repulse of the Confederates. Surrounded by 
the milling flux of the wounded and the dazed, plus herds 
of Rebel prisoners, Meade could only ask in amazement: 
"What! Is the assault already repulsed?" 
AB evening approached on July 3, Meade moved to 
Cemetery Hill-still suspecting that a Confederate blow 
would fall there-and from there to Little Round Top, 
where he ordered Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford and his old 
Pennsylvania Reserve division to launch a tentative 
sweeping operation toward the Confederate right flank, 
where John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws' shredded 
divisions lay. James Longstreet fully expected "to see 
Meade ride to the front and lead his forces to a tremen-
dous counter-charge." But Meade had even fewer re-
sources at his disposal now, and even less inclination to 
risk what now looked to be a resounding victory. Brigadier 
General Gouverneur Warren, the army's chief engineer, 
conceded that "Meade ordered demonstrations in front of 
One Yank Speaks for Many 
Major John I. Nevin of the 93rd Pennsylvania 
reflected a common view of his commander 
when he wrote in his diary on July 5, 1863: 
'' I wonder whether we 
really whipped the Rebs at 
Gettysburg so very bad after 
all? If so, I wonder whether 
our leaders knew it, or know 
it yet? If they do, I have one 
more wonder, I wonder if 
Napoleon or even Robt Lee 
were our commander this 
evening would they pursue 
a defeated army in this 
cautious, courteous way?'' 
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Fierce artillery fire before Pickett's Charge drove Meade from his headquarters, above, in the Widow Leister house along the Taneytown 
Road. This immediate post-battle image shows the destruction caused by the shellfire. A dead horse lies at the edge of the road. 
our line" on July 4, "but they were very feebly made." 
On July 14 Lee successfully got his survivors across the 
Potomac River, to fight another day. The Army of the 
Potomac was "incensed," wrote the surgeon of the 77th 
New York. "The correspondents of the press misrepre-
sent the facts nine times in ten when they assert that vet-
erans are anxious to fight," snorted Captain Henry Ni-
chols Blake of the 11th Massachusetts, but in this case 
"the soldiers who bore muskets wished to hear the com-
mands, 'Take arms,' and 'Charge,' because they knew 
then ... that it would have captured all the cannon, materi-
als, and men from the enemy and finished the Rebellion." 
But those were not the commands Blake, or anyone else, 
would hear from George Gordon Meade. 
And yet Meade did not lose the Battle of 
Gettysburg-if he had, the results would have been cata-
strophic for the Union, even with the offset of the fall of 
Vicksburg on July 4. But he allowed his own native instinct 
for risk aversion, his newness to overall command of the 
Army of the Potomac, and the shadow of McClellanite pol-
itics to keep him from turning it into a Waterloo victory. 
Meade was acutely conscious that if he were successful 
at Gettysburg the rewards a Republican administration 
would offer him would probably be meager. If he should 
lose, his career would be destroyed beyond any hope of 
recovery. So if Meade failed to pursue Lee to destruction 
after Gettysburg, Meade could (with some justice) con-
sider that Lincoln and the Republicans had no one to 
blame for it but themselves, for having made the condi-
tions of command so politicized. Add to that his own in-
stinct for caution, and it has to be said that Meade turned 
in a surprisingly fine performance at Gettysburg. But he 
was not a Wellington, and he was not a Grant, and it was 
the treasure and blood that two more years of war would 
demand from the nation that would forever mottle 
George Meade's surprising victory with the historical 
ooze of disappointment. 
Allen C. Guelzo is the H enry R. Luce Professor of the 
Civil War Era at Gettysburg College and the author of 
Gettysburg: The Last Invasion (Knopf). 
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